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      We have used Eurostat's Labour Force Survey data for employment and unemployment. The data are available1
by country (European Union), by sector of industry, occupation (ISCO 68/88), age and highest level of education
attained (corresponding to the ISCED educational classification). The data have been provided only for the period
1988-1994, because Eurostat did not perform an educational desaggregation of (un-)employment data for earlier
years. In 1992, two major changes occurred in the classification of the data. First, the classification of sectors of
industry changed from NACE-CLIO to NACE-Revision 1. Second, the classification of occupations changed from
ISCO 68 to ISCO 88. In the data available, skills refer to the highest level of education attained by workers. We
distinguish between a high (H), medium (M) and low (L) level of acquired education. The high educational level
corresponds with high vocational and university education. The low educational level corresponds to primary school
and low secondary school (up to age 16). Medium education is everything in between.
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Figure 1
1 Introduction
One of the most pressing problems of today is the unequal distribution of the burden of
unemployment across different skill groups. Especially low-skilled workers are more often
unemployed than other skills. For example, Figure 1 below shows the unemployment shares
for three different skill categories in the Netherlands and Germany . In the Netherlands, the1
low-skilled workers are in a unfortunate possition in comparison with the other two skill
categories, whereas in Germany, the shares in total unemployment are fairly high for both the
low- and medium-skilled people.  Next to the fact that the unemployment share of low-skilled
workers is very high, they are also unemployed for longer periods of time.
The unevenness of this distribution would seem to indicate that having different skills
determines to some extent one's employment/unemployment opportunities. Nonetheless,
policy prescriptions meant to alleviate the problems associated with the uneven distribution of
unemployment are primarily based on (conceptual) models which effectively ignore skill-
differences between workers and which therefore do not directly address the issues involved.
      See Drèze and Malinvaud, 1993, ‘Growth and Employment, the Scope of European Initiative’, Mimeo,2
CORE/College de France, Louvain-la-Neuve/Paris.  
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Policy recommendations involving wage-flexibility or reductions in costs of hiring and firing,
for example, seem to be based on the notion that essentially skills are not the distinctive
elements in defining the employment opportunities of an individual. Instead, individual ‘skill-
services’ being over-priced or being too costly to hire and/or fire, are often regarded to be the
‘real cause’ of disparities in unemployment rates by skill. In this paper we will argue that this
neglects the fact that people with high skills have intrinsically more employment
opportunities than people with low skills. This is because low-skilled people may find it (too)
hard to fill high-level jobs. High-skilled people on the other hand may be expected to be able
to perform, in principle at least, in both low-level jobs and high-level jobs. In addition, it may
well be possible that high-skilled workers are more efficient than low-skilled workers on low-
level jobs.
Given these asymmetries between low-skilled and high-skilled workers’ employment
opportunities, it follows directly that the number of low-level jobs is an upper limit to low-
skilled employment, while the number of high-skilled jobs is a lower limit to high-skilled
employment. Hence, in the absence of supply bottle-necks, high-skilled employment can not
fall below the number of high-level jobs, whereas low-skilled employment may even fall to
zero, when high-skilled workers take over low-level jobs. While, therefore, the creation of a
high-level job necessarily favours high-skilled employment, effective employment prospects
of the low-skilled are not necessarily improved by the creation of low-level jobs. Instead, a
combination of measures may need to be taken to overcome the influence of the ‘non one-to-
one’ correspondence between low skills and low-level jobs on low-skilled unemployment as
opposed to the one-to-one correspondence between high skills and high-level jobs.
The allocation of high-skilled workers to low-level jobs drives low-skilled workers from the
only jobs they can take, so unequivocally reducing employment opportunities for low-skilled
workers, ceteris paribus. While these negative employment effects could in principle be
mitigated by the creation of still more low-level jobs, it is not at all that clear that this ‘trickle
down effect’  will succeed in furthering employment of the low-skilled. For, the effectiveness2
of the ‘trickle down effect’ depends essentially on the infeasibility or undesirability of the
allocation of high-skilled workers to low-level jobs: only in the case of a shortage of supply of
high-skilled workers or in the case of relatively high costs per efficiency unit of labour
generated by high-skilled workers on low-level jobs, low-skilled workers will indeed be hired
for low-level jobs. 
An additional asymmetry between different skill types of labour lies in the possibility that
low-skilled workers may be low-skilled because it is difficult for them to learn enough to
become high-skilled. With firms having become ‘leaner and meaner’ over the last decade, this
‘learning-inability’ may provide incentives for entrepreneurs to hire workers who are flexible
in the sense that they could easily learn different types of tasks instead of hiring people who
      Obviously, from a macro-perspective, changes in the sectoral composition of output may change the job-3
composition of employment too, but in this paper we disregard this.
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can only perform a limited number of tasks. These learning asymmetries between low-skilled
and high-skilled workers may also be part of the explanation of the uneven distribution of
unemployment across skills.
The above suggests that there are a number of ways (and combinations thereof) to increase the
employment prospects for low-skilled workers. The first one is by increasing the number of
low-level jobs, the second by decreasing the relative labour costs of low-skilled workers thus
increasing the willingness of entrepreneurs to allocate low- skilled workers to low-level jobs
instead of high-skilled workers, and the third by increasing the number of jobs which only
high-skilled workers can take. A fourth option would be to uplift the skill-level of low-skilled
workers to some extent by means of (re-) training programmes.
The effectiveness of the first possibility depends in part on the availability of high-skilled
workers for low-level jobs, as suggested above. The effectiveness of the second measure is
limited to the extent that such a change in relative wage costs at first tends to increase the
unemployment of high-skilled workers while decreasing the unemployment of low-skilled
workers. Only when wage-costs per unit of output would fall, a net expansion of jobs may be
expected to occur and therefore a positive net effect on overall employment. Otherwise the
bias in unemployment will just shift against high-skilled workers. The third measure
structurally decreases the excess supply of high- skilled workers for low-level jobs, and hence
increases employment prospects for the low-skilled, almost as a beneficial side-effect. The
fourth measure, in as far as it would be feasible, would be highly desirable for it would
structurally diminish the constraints put on employment opportunities by the existence of
substitution asymmetries between skills.
In this paper we will describe a model which combines most of the notions regarding
asymmetries between low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers mentioned above. We
will look at the influence of asymmetries in substitution / allocation possibilities, but also of
asymmetries in learning capabilities between skills. To this end we specify a model of labour
demand defined in terms of jobs, which given the supply of labour distinguished in
accordance with skill-levels, requires matches to be made between the skills supplied and the
jobs under consideration. The model is highly neo-classical in nature except for the
asymmetries mentioned above, and the vintage character of the capital stock, so as to assure a
reasonable comparability with the working of models used by the EC or the OECD, for
instance. The vintage character of the capital stock is important in practice, because of the
embodiment of the job-composition of employment in the capital stock. Hence, changes in
employment prospects as they are provided by changes in the job-composition of
employment, will generally depend on the rate of investment. This is because investment in
new machinery and equipment only provides the means to (marginally) change the job-
composition of employment.3
      Many writers have investigated the possibility of direct substitution between skill-categories. A survey for4
the US is provided by Hamermesh and Grant (1979), while Hebbink (1990) and Broer and Jansen (1989)
provide some results for the Netherlands. Kugler c.s. (1990) do the same for Germany. Mincer (1989) provides
additional results for the US. The general conclusions which emerge from these studies are first that capital and
high-skilled labour are complements, while secondly low-skilled labour and the capital/high-skilled labour
complex are substitutes.
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The set-up of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we describe the demand for labour in the
face of asymmetric substitution/allocation possibilities between different skills on low-level
jobs. Section 3 describes the integration of heterogeneous labour in a Bischoff-type vintage
model, while section 4 is devoted to a number of simulation experiments. Section 5 contains
some concluding remarks.
2 Jobs, Skills and Asymmetries in Substitution Possibilities
2.1 Introduction
High-skilled people may in general be expected to perform better in low-skilled jobs than
low-skilled people in high-skilled jobs. Hence, in terms of the allocation of skills to jobs there
must be an intrinsic (more or less technical) bias against allocating low-skilled people to high-
skilled jobs. Nonetheless, some kind of substitution between higher skills and lower skills
should be possible, since empirical investigations in this area all point to a substitution set-up
where high-skilled people are complements of capital, and low-skilled people in turn can be
substituted for this high-skilled people/capital complex.4
In our set-up, a job is a set of tasks which need to be performed, and which require the people
engaged in that job to have a certain minimum skill-level in order to be able to perform the
tasks in question. These specific skill requirements define the level of the job. Moreover, a
low-skilled job requires only low skill-levels in order to be able to execute the tasks belonging
to a specific job. And so, everybody who has the minimum required level of skills available
can actually be hired for that job. Therefore, generally speaking, high-skilled people can be
hired for more levels of jobs than low-skilled people. This provides an asymmetry in
employment opportunities for high-skilled and low-skilled people, which, given a certain lack
of compensating asymmetries in wage formation, might lead to a bias in employment
opportunities in favour of high-skilled people rather than low-skilled people.
2.2 Ex Ante Labour Demand
Let us assume that the design of a production process entails the definition of certain
packages of tasks for lower- and higher-skilled people. Let us furthermore assume that
technical constraints on combining these tasks are such that a decrease of the number of high-
skilled jobs must be compensated by an increase in the number of low-skilled jobs and vice
      These are the ‘standard’ substitution assumptions in neo-classical production theory. We also assume that5
the implied ‘job aggregator function’ or ‘job substitution function’ obeys the usual restrictions on the signs of
the first and second partial derivatives.
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Figure 2. Substitution Between Jobs and Skills
versa.  Furthermore, given the layout of the production process in terms of the number of5
high-skilled and low-skilled jobs required to generate one efficiency unit of labour, the actual
allocation of people to those jobs is a separate issue. Because of the asymmetries described
above, we know that low-skilled people can not efficiently perform in high-skilled jobs,
whereas high-skilled people can perform efficiently in both low-skilled and high-skilled jobs.
This means that the number of low-skilled jobs is an upper-limit to the number of low-skilled
people which may actually be employed, while the number of high-skilled jobs is a lower
limit to the number of high-skilled people which may actually find employment.
Assuming that the efficiency of a high-skilled person relative to a low-skilled person in a low-
skilled job is the constant number e', it follows that the framework sketched above can be
pictured as in Figure 2. 
In this figure, the curve j'j defines the number of low-skilled jobs and high-skilled jobs which
are required to generate one efficiency unit of labour, assuming, for the moment, that all low-
skilled jobs are filled by low-skilled people (L) and all high-skilled jobs are filled by high-
skilled people (H).
Let us assume that point Q represents the optimum choice, where the optimum combination
Lt
L

#e 	t 	 e ' # (Ht	H  #e 	t)
Ht
(L /e'H )e 	t
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(1)
(2)
of jobs requiring only low skills and jobs requiring high skills is represented by the point
(L*,H*). Then the kinked line eQH' represents the combinations of all low-skilled and high-
skilled people which can generate the same amount and quality of the labour services which
would be provided by exactly L* low-skilled people and exactly H* high-skilled people. The
relative efficiency of low-skilled people in high-skilled jobs is equal to zero by assumption, as
indicated by the vertical line-segment Qe in Figure 2. Hence, H can not fall below H* without
reducing the total number of labour-efficiency units. When H is equal to H', then all low-
skilled labour L is replaced by high-skilled labour H and still one job efficiency unit is
generated, i.e. H'=H* + L*/e'. Actually, all combinations of L and H on the line segment
connecting points H' and Q are combinations of low-skilled and high-skilled people which
generate one labour efficiency unit. The tangent of the angle of this line segment with the
horizontal axis is equal to -e', i.e. minus the relative efficiency.
It should be noted that in this set-up it is assumed that the production process itself is
defined/designed in terms of job combinations H* and L*. The design itself is then
implemented in terms of the layout of machinery and equipment. It is assumed that this layout
can not be altered afterwards. However, the actual allocation of low- and high-skilled people
to low- and high-skilled jobs can still be varied in accordance with equation (1) below.
Given the location of H* and L* on the unit-job isoquant, the location of the line-segment Qe'
is determined too. Hence the choice of H* and L* also defines the combinations of high-
skilled and low-skilled people which may actually be observed to be employed. If we, for
reasons of simplicity, would ignore the possibility of supply constraints and adjustment costs
in this particular set-up, then the combinations of low- and high-skilled people which may
actually be observed at time t, for given levels of L* and H* which have been chosen at time
zero, are given by:
where  enters the analysis because we assume that the job design is embodied in machinery
and equipment which is subject to (exponential) technical decay at rate . H' in turn is the
maximum number of H people required to generate one labour efficiency unit. It can easily be
determined from (1) by setting L=0 :
It follows directly that, for given wages by skill w  and w , entrepreneurs can influence theH L
cost of operating a labour-efficiency unit in two different ways, i.e. first by choosing a certain
combination (H*,L*) and secondly by choosing combinations (H,L) given (H*,L*), subject to
equation (1). Then, assuming that entrepreneurs can determine the job-layout of their
production process (i.e. (H*,L*)) only when new capacity is installed, it follows that the
present value of the operating cost of one labour-efficiency unit installed at time zero declines
with the progress of time with the discount rate r and with the rate of technical depreciation ,
which is already included in (1) and (2). Hence, the expected present value of total operating
T


0
w
e
H , t #Ht  w
e
L , t #Lt #e
	r # t dt
Min Ft 


0
w
e
H , t #Ht  w
e
L,t #Lt #e
	r#t
s.t. Lt 
 L
e 	#t 	 e' # (Ht	H e 	#t )
(L
L e 	 # t, H
H e 	 # t)
wˆ
wˆH	wˆL
wˆH wˆL
wˆ<0 wˆ>0 wˆ<0
wˆ>0
wˆ<0
wˆ>0
      Note that due to Hicks-neutral disembodied labour augmenting technical change, the effective discount6
rate of job-operating costs rises with the value of the rate of disembodied technical progress. However, for now
we disregard the influence of technical change.
      From now on we drop time-subscripts, unless this would lead to confusion.7
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(3)
(4)
cost of one labour-efficiency unit which is installed at time zero is given by :
where w  and w  are the expected values of the wage rate for high-skilled and for low-e eH,t L,t
skilled people at time t, respectively.  We will approach the problem of the minimisation of6
(3) subject to (1) in two steps, analogous to the two possibilities sketched above.
2.2.1 The Allocation of Skills in the Absence of Adjustment Costs
In the absence of supply constraints and adjustment costs,  and given a job-combination
(L*,H*), the choices of L  and H  can be modelled by solving:t t
Given the nature of the problem, (H=H',L=0) is the solution to (4) when w / w <e', whilee eH L
 is the solution when the opposite is the case.7
Using the shorthand notation w=w / w  and , for given and constant expectede eH L
exponential growth rates  and , there are now four distinct possibilities to consider,
depending on whether w < e' or w > e' and  or . For instance, when w < e' and 
(case 1) the optimal solution will always be (H=H',L=0). But when w < e' and  (case 2)
there will be a moment when the other solution (H=H*,L=L*) will be chosen. A switch
between states will also occur in case 3, which starts out with w > e' and . Case 4 will
always have (H=H*,L=L*) since w > e' and . The four cases are depicted in Figure 3.
wt 

wH , t 
wL , t 


wH,0
wL,0
#e
(wˆH	wˆL) # t 

 e ' 
> t  

ln e' /
wH ,0
wL ,0
wˆH	wˆL


ln(e'/w0)
wˆ
T1 
 P

0
wH ,0 #H' #e
(wˆH	' ) # tdt 
 	
wH ,0
wˆH	’
# (L /e'H ) 
 1 #H 1 #L 
      Although this has not been indicated in Figure 3, t* can of course be different for cases 2 and 3.8
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Figure 3. Expected Wage Growth and Skill-Switching
(5)
(6)
In cases 2 and 3 a switch from the one corner solution to the other will take place at time t*.8
t* itself is easily determined from the condition that :
Using equation (5), the solution of the original problem over an infinite horizon can be
defined as the solution to the problem of minimizing unit operating costs over two
consecutive horizons, namely 0-t* and t*-.
Choosing Jobs
The solution to the allocation problem defined by the minimisation of (3) subject to (1), is
easily obtained by substituting (1) and (5) into (3). The solution of the objective function for
case 1 can now be written as :
1/r 
 P

0
e 	r # tdt
01
0H k
01
0L k


k
k
1
Ti
i #H

i #L

k /k
      See Annex A.9
      Recall that for r>0.10
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(7)
where   and  are implicitly defined by (6) and T  denotes the value of the objective1 1
function given by (3) for case 1 as described in Figure 3. The term ’ is equal to the rate of
technical decay plus the discount rate. Note that  ,    > 0. Note also that the objective1 1
function T1 is linear in L* and H*. Hence, maximisation of T1 by choosing (L*,H*)
constrained by the unit job-isoquant  1 (L*,H*)=1 should lead to a straight forward
determination of L*, and H* in terms of e', relative wages, relative growth rates in wages and
the parameters of the job-substitution function 1 (L*,H*). As was the case with T , T -T  can1 2 4
also be written as  . The resulting values of  and  are summarised in
Annex A.
In order to be able to solve the intertemporal cost-minimisation problem, we have had to
assume that the sum of the discount rate and the rate of technical decay exceeds the expected
rate of growth of wages. These assumptions imply that all the ’s and ’s are positive, and so
the intertemporal cost-minimisation problem has a meaningful solution in all four cases.  This9
solution is implicitly given by the first order condition:
where L*  and H*  reflect the optimum values of L* and H* when case k (as depicted ink k
Figure 3) is expected to hold. Note that (7) is totally comparable with the first order
conditions of a static cost-minimisation problem, and hence we can conclude that a fall in the
ratio  corresponds to a decrease in the slope of the iso-cost lines and hence to a
movement down the unit job isoquant (see Figure 2) and hence to a decrease in the L*/H*
ratio.
Discussion of the Results
Case 4 may be considered as a bench-mark case in the sense that it generates results which are
comparable to the ones which would be obtained for a static cost-minimisation problem.
Recall that in case 4 the solution is given by (L=L*,H=H*) and that there is no switching, i.e.
L>0 for all t. The only difference between the solution of a static cost-minimisation problem
and the problem on hand, is that the (discounted) costs of high-skilled and low-skilled people
are cumulated over an infinite horizon, as indicated by the denominators of   and   which4 4
reflect the geometric cumulation process.  10
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It is easy to show from the / ratios that case 1 will have the lowest value of the L*/H* ratio,
while case 3 will have a larger L*/H* ratio than case 4. Case 2 in turn will have a larger
L*/H* ratio than case 1, that is: (L*/H*)  > (L*/H*)  > (L*/H*)  = e' and (L*/H*)  >3 4 1 2
(L*/H*)  = e'.1
Case 1 is an interesting case in the sense that the L*/H* ratio depends on e' only. This is
caused by the fact that e' provides a 'technical' limit to the marginal rate of substitution of
high-skilled jobs for low-skilled jobs. Indeed, it does not pay to let the marginal rate of job-
substitution along the isoquant fall below e', because the corresponding solution to the cost-
minimisation problem (L=0,H=H') would in that case result in an upward shift of the iso-cost
line again. For, this implies that all job-combinations on the unit job-isoquant to the right of Q
would generate higher unit costs than Q itself. Hence, given the substitution possibilities
between skills ex post, these ex ante job combinations to the right of Q, have become
irrelevant from an economic point of view.
Note that in case 4, L*/H* exceeds the corresponding ratio which is obtained in case 1. This is
in line with what one would expect, since in case 1 low-skilled workers are relatively
expensive and get ever more expensive, while in case 4 high-skilled workers are more
expensive and grow even more expensive over time. Case 3 has an L*/H* ratio which
exceeds the corresponding ratio of case 4. This follows from the fact that low-skilled jobs are
expected to be filled by high-skilled workers in the future which, although more expensive
than low-skilled workers in the beginning, get less and less expensive over time. Hence, the
prospective switch from low-skilled workers to high-skilled workers on low-skilled jobs,
makes low-skilled jobs less costly on average, for a given development of low-skilled wages.
A similar line of reasoning can be followed in the comparison of cases 1 and 2, where high-
skilled jobs become relatively more expensive and hence low-skilled jobs (although initially
filled with high-skilled people) are substituted for high-skilled jobs.
2.2.2 The Allocation of Skills and Adjustment Costs
We now assume that the allocation of a specific skill to a job gives rise to adjustment costs,
which we interpret in terms of learning cost. When a person is allocated to a job, we assume
that he needs to spend some time learning all the tricks in the trade. The time spent is a given
fraction of ‘normal working hours’ for a person already trained for the job. We assume
furthermore that a trainee does not produce anything while learning. Nonetheless the trainee
gets paid for his time. This implies that the learning cost per person is proportional to the
wage rate which applies to the type of skill of the person in question. The corresponding
factor of proportion depends both on the skill of the person in question and the type of job he
is trained for. In addition to this, we assume that each time a job is filled, training costs will
have to be incurred. Obviously, people who have been trained already for a certain job do not
have to be trained again as long as they remain allocated to the job they have been trained for.
Consequently, the experience they have in a certain job brings about an additional asymmetry
in the costs of operating a job by either experienced workers or inexperienced workers of the
same skill type. 
CF 
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 #
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(8)
(9)
(10)
Let the training cost  of an allocation of skill i to jobtype j, as a fraction of the relevant wage
rate w , be given by the symbol ! . Furthermore, let us consider the case where . Then,i i,j
eventually the allocation (L->L*) will be the cost-minimising allocation, because the wage
rate of high-skilled people will become infinitely high, while the relative efficiency e' of high-
skilled people vis a vis low-skilled people in low-level jobs will remain the same. The
question arises whether low-skilled workers (L) should be allocated to a low-level job (L*)
from the outset, or high-skilled workers (H) should be allocated to that low-level job first. As
in the no-adjustment case, we assume that this depends on the present value of operating the
job over an infinite period of time for given expectations of the growth rate of relative wages
and for given values of the learning cost parameters. The present value of the cost of
‘manning’ and operating a low-level job with its final allocation from the outset C , is givenF
by:
Where (8) refers to the costs of manning a low level job with an inexperienced low-skilled
worker. For experienced workers initial matching costs can be disregarded. However, for, for
a switch in the future, we assume that entrepreneurs will always expect to use inexperienced
workers, in order to be on the ‘safe side’. Hence, the present value of the cost of ‘manning’
and operating a low-level job C  by starting with the allocation (H->L*) first and thenS
switching to the final allocation (L->L*) at time t*, is given by :
where the initial allocation (H->L*) involves an inexperienced high-skilled worker. In
equation (9), t* represents the moment of switching. t* itself can be determined by
minimisation of (9) w.r.t. t*, giving :
t* depends positively on the (effective) rate of discount ’ (which includes the rate of technical
wˆ>0

 (’	wˆL) #!L ,L
CF 
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w0 > e ' # (1(’	wˆL) #!L ,L )
wˆ > 0
!H ,L  #wH ,0
wˆ < 0
      In van Zon and Muysken (1996), switching costs are introduced by means of the notion of a switching11
threshold . I.e. entrepreneurs switch from (H->L*) to (L->L*) only when w > e’(1+) and . Note that  can
directly be interpreted in terms of matching costs, since the switching threshold approach and the matching costs
approach taken here are equivalent when . Note that this is only an approximate equivalence,
however, since matching costs depend on whether one switches to (L->L*) or (H ->L*). , being a constant, is by
definition indepedent of the skill involved in the match which is to be realised.
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decay).  A rise in either of the parameters would decrease the relative importance of future11
costs in the present value of total cost per low-level job. Hence, the incentive to switch would
diminish, thus increasing t*, ceteris paribus. Likewise, a rise in the adjustment cost of the
final allocation (L->L*) would tend to postpone the moment of switching, i.e. increase  t*,
while a rise in the rate of growth of the wage rate of the skill used in the final allocation,
would tend to increase the unit cost associated with that allocation, and hence the moment of
switching may again be expected to be postponed. This is in line with the fact that ,
for t* > 0.
From equation (10) it is clear that t* is positive, only when , since
by assumption. If t* is positive, then an entrepreneur who had started out with the
allocation (H->L*) would be happy to stick with that allocation upto time t*. If
, t* would be negative, and the optimum moment of switching
from (H->L*) to (L->L*) would lie in the past, implying that under the circumstances it
would have been wise to choose the final allocation (L->L*) from the outset. But even if
t*>0, it may be wise to start with the allocation (L->L*) rather than the allocation (H->L*),
for differentiation of (8) really assumes that learning costs associated with the allocation (H-
>L*) have already been sunk. Considering the fact that (L->L*) is the final allocation, the
allocation sequence (H->L*) , (L ->L*) involves making matching costs twice rather than just
once in the case of starting out with the final allocation (L->L*). However, in the latter case,
the present value of the matching cost associated with the allocation (L->L*) increases, ceteris
paribus, because the match itself is made at time zero rather than at t*. Moreover, the
operating cost of a low-level job during the period upto time t* is now w  rather than w  / e',L,t H,t
which, considering the assumption that from time zero onwards, implies a further cost
disadvantage for the allocation (L->L*) vis a vis the allocation (H->L*) during the period
upto t*. However, when is large enough to compensate these cost-disadvantages,
(L->L*) should be chosen at time zero instead of the allocation (H->L*). This choice can
most easily be made by evaluating and comparing C  and C . F S
The analysis can be repeated for the case where , which implies that ultimately the
allocation (H->L*) instead of (L->L*) will be the least costly one. In this case the present
value of the cost associated with manning and operating a low-level job L*, by using the
allocation (H ->L*) from the outset is given by :
CS 
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By analogy, the cost  C  of ‘manning’ and operating a low-level job using the allocationS
sequence (L->L*),(H->L*), is given by :
As before, the optimum switching moment can readily be obtained from (12) by minimising
C  w.r.t. t*, giving:S
2.3 Linear Programming and the ‘Chimney Effect’
2.3.1 Introduction
In order for the chimney effect to work, it is necessary that the allocation of high-skilled
workers towards low-level jobs is decreased. In the demand-context of the model defined so
far, this constellation of events would require w  / w  to rise. The ensuing change in theH L
composition of employment could then be interpreted as a chimney effect. However, this
notion would necessarily be false, because demand induced changes in the number of high-
level jobs do not automatically and explicitly spill-over into changes in the skill-composition
of low-level jobs, as is required in order for the chimney effect to really do its work. When we
would introduce supply constraints, however, while taking account of asymmetries in
substitution possibilities between high- and low-skilled workers, the chimney effect arises
automatically. For, in those circumstances, an increase in the number of high-level jobs would
require an increase in the employment of high-skilled workers on those jobs, since these
workers are the only ones which are suited for those jobs. The inflow of high-skilled workers
into those high-level jobs would in part have to be met by an outflow of high-skilled workers
from low-level jobs. The employment-holes this outflow would leave in low-level jobs,
creates the employment-opportunities on which the low-skilled workers depend.
In order to add supply constraints to the existing labour demand framework, we can use the
technique of Linear Programming, as we have done before in van Zon and Muysken (1992).
In this way, we are able to explicitly account for both job demand constraints and skill-supply
constraints. 
      Note that the term mismatch used here, usually refers to the a priori notion that the best match is the one12
where the skill-level is exactly equal to the job-level. From a (learning) cost-minimisation point of view, this is
not necessarily the case, however, because of the possibility of ‘skill-switching’. In this context therefore, a
mismatch refers to a non cost-minimising allocation of skills to jobs, which may be due to the existence of
supply constraints, for instance.
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2.3.2 Definition of the LP-Problem
The demand side described so far, is based on the assumption that there are no supply
constraints. Consequently, the allocation of skills to jobs referred to first best allocations only.
But explicit supply constraints which become binding may force entrepreneurs to use second
best allocations instead. In order to be able to cover both first-best and second-best
allocations, we assume that entrepreneurs solve a linear programming problem in which they
try to meet job requirements as well as skill supply constraints, while minimising the
mismatch  between skill-levels and job-levels on low-level jobs.12
The definition of the LP-Problem is now quite straightforward. Let E  denote theij,k
employment of skill j with experience type i on job k. The index i has two values :
experienced and inexperienced with respect to the match in question. The distinction between
experienced and inexperienced workers is important because of the fact that the allocation of
an inexperienced worker with a certain skill level implies having to bear the training/matching
costs associated with that particular combination of skills and jobs, while this is not the case
with experienced workers. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between experienced
and inexperienced workers at the supply side too. In this respect we simply assume that the
experienced workers available for allocation in the present period are those which were
allocated to the job under consideration in the previous period, adjusted for a constant exit-
rate. Supply from other sources (like the educational system or the unemployment pool, for
instance), which is available for employment is inexperienced by assumption.
Given these supply constraints, we can now force the solution of the LP-problem to be as
close as possible to the first-best allocation in the following way. First we introduce the
notion of the quasi-job-utilisation rate q (with 0<=q<=1). When q=1, the skills allocated to
low-level jobs and high-level jobs are exactly sufficient to generate the labour efficiency units
in those jobs as implied by the composition and level of labour demand by job. Consequently,
the LP-problem should be specified in such a way that q is as close as possible to 1, but not
larger than 1, i.e. job-demand constraints should be met as closely as possible. At the same
time we want to have these labour efficiency units by job generated in the right proportions at
a cost which is as low as possible. However, the costs associated with a certain allocation
should also be in line with ex ante behaviour, i.e. an initial allocation should be considered as
the first allocation of an allocation sequence, as in the ex ante job-demand problem, rather
than being a skill-job allocation which is isolated in time from other allocations to the job
under consideration : there is no reason a priori to assume that cost-considerations ex ante and
      If we would 'value' q with the expected present value of the costs of the first-best allocation sequences, then13
the objective function would have a maximum value equal to zero, which could also be attained for a zero level of
q. Hence, q=0 is both feasible and optimum. But this would imply zero levels for all allocations of skills to jobs,
which is not what we are after. Hence, our reformulation of the cost minimisation problem in terms of a
maximisation of cost-reductions relative to the worst-case scenario.
      Note that because the LP-problem is essentially a static optimisation problem, the intertemporal effects of14
particular allocations are not taken into account (like, for instance the fact that the inexperienced workers of
today are the experienced workers of tomorrow). In the case of intertemporal optimisation under uncertainty
regarding the level of demand for output, other interesting aspects of asymmetries in learning costs and
substitution possibilities by skill become more relevant. In particular, one can envisage a situation where from
an intertemporal cost minimisation point of view under uncertain conditions regarding output growth, we would
expect a bias in the demand for skills towards the ones which could be used in as many jobs as possible at
intertemporal costs which are as low as possible (including expected matching costs). This provides an
intertemporal cost minimisation interpretation to the notion of a 'flexible' worker.
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ex post as regards the allocation of skills to jobs would be different. Hence, a particular
allocation of a skill to a certain job would by necessity be the one which follows from the ex
ante cost-considerations, unless supply constraints for the skill under consideration would
somehow prove to be binding. Hence, the assignment of skills to jobs at any moment in time
can be seen as the implementation of various allocation sequences associated with the
different jobs under consideration, within the constraints set by the supply of the various skills
involved.
In order to define the objective function of the LP-problem, we now assume a worst-case
production scenario, where all jobs are assigned the least-best allocation sequences, for given
expectations regarding the growth rates of wages, etcetera. We now define the objective
function to be equal to q times the expected present value of the cost of the worst-case
scenario when operated at a value of the job-utilisation rate equal to 1, less the costs of the
allocation sequences which could be continued/activated within the given supply constraints.
Obviously, maximisation of this function would require q to be as close to one as possible,
and the expected present value of the costs of the activated/continued allocation sequences to
be as small as possible. Hence, cost-reductions vis a vis the worst-case scenario would be
maximised for a non-zero value of q.  13 14
Let J*  denote the optimum job-levels H*, L* (where k denotes a job-level), i.e. the numberk
of people with a corresponding skill-level needed to fill the job. Let P  denote the wage-costij,k
(including the corresponding training cost for inexperienced workers) associated with a non-
zero value of first- and/or second best allocation sequences starting with the employment of
skill j and experience type i on type k jobs. V denotes the total labour costs associated with
the worst case scenario.Then, the LP-problem can be defined as :
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where S  denotes the total supply of skill j at time t, S  is the total supply of skill j withj j,ki
experience type i with respect to job k. e'  is the relative efficiency of skill-level i on job-leveli,j
j. Note that e' =0 for skill-levels j less than the job-level k, and e' =1 for all j, by definition. j,k j,j
The first set of constraints are the job demand constraints. The employment of available skills
should generate the required efficiency units of labour in each job. The second set of
constraints are the skill supply constraints. They state that the total use of experienced
workers can not exceed the available supply. The third set of constraints state that the total
use of skills may not exceed total supply (including both experienced and inexperienced
workers). The last constraint requires employment to be not larger than needed.
Given the solution to this LP-problem, total employment by skill can now readily be obtained
by aggregating over all experience categories and all jobs. The only things which need to be
defined are the expected present value  of the costs of the relevant allocation sequences per
unit of the skill which is the first one in each sequence, i.e. the P 's.ij,k
2.3.3 The Valuation of Alternative Allocation Sequences
In valueing a certain allocation sequence, we assume that entrepreneurs do not expect to face
supply constraints in the future, unless they are faced with supply constraints in the present.
But even if the latter is the case, they are assumed to act as if these supply constraints would
remain binding for a fixed period only, which is equal to years. Non-binding supply
constraints are assumed to remain non-binding forever, until proven wrong. Furthermore,
future matches/switches, as opposed to present matches, are assumed to involve
inexperienced workers in all cases.
Given expectations regarding the growth rate of relative wages by skill, the optimum
switching moment t* for each possible allocation sequence starting with a certain skill can be
calculated. If t* proves to be positive, then the allocation sequence in question may prove to
be first-best. If not, then the allocation sequence must be second best, because switching to
the second part of the allocation sequence at time zero (i.e. starting out with the second part of
the allocation sequence, as indicated by t*<=0) would lead to a lower expected present value
of the costs of the allocation sequence under consideration. Note, however, that this second-
best allocation sequence would only be chosen when supply constraints would force
entrepreneurs to actually do so. Hence, in this particular case, entrepreneurs expect to stay at
least years with this particular skill-job combination, after which they could decide to
wˆ>0 P
x
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 e
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,) )
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      FB(AS) denotes a first best allocation sequence AS. When AS consists of two single allocations, a switch15
between both single allocations is expected to occur at time t*.
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return to the unconstrained optimum allocation sequence, if that would prove to be
worthwhile, or they could decide to stick with the 'forced' allocation instead. The latter could
prove to be the most profitable ex post, since 'returning' to the unconstrained allocation
sequence entails the 'sinking' of matching costs in the future. We now assume that the cost to
be assigned to the first part of the allocation sequence is equal to the minimum of these two
options, i.e. 'sticking' and 'returning'.
When we would evaluate the expected present value of the costs of a certain allocation
sequence starting out with an experienced worker, then the corresponding costs of the same
allocation sequence starting out with an inexperienced worker can simply be obtained by
adding matching costs to the cost of an experienced worker. Hence, all possible matches can
be defined knowing the expected present value of allocating an experienced worker to a
certain job, as part of a certain allocation sequence. These present value costs are defined in
the Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1 Expected Present Value Costs by Allocation Sequence
t*>0, FB(H->L*,L->L*) 15
t*>0, FB(L->L*,H->L*)
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t*<0, FB(L->L*)
t*<=0, FB(H->L*)
PV(S,t0,t1) represents the present value of the cost of operating a low-level job, using skill S
during the period t0-t1. If t0>0, then PV includes the expected present value of the matching
costs associated with making the match S at time t0. If t0=0, i.e. S starts from the present
moment, then matching costs are excluded, since the table above refers to the costs associated
with using experienced workers in the first part of the allocation sequence under
consideration. PV() is defined as the cost of operating a low-level job, but it needs to be
redefined as the costs of an allocation sequence starting with an experienced worker with a
certain skill on a low-level job, in order to be of any relevance for the LP-problem which was
described above. Hence, the cost of operating a low-level job (i.e. the cost of supplying one
efficiency unit of low-level labour on a low-level job) can easily be transformed into the cost
of using a certain worker in a certain job, by multiplying PV(S,t0,t1) by e' . Note that e' inS,L
the table above, really stands for e' , while e' =1 by definition, and is therefore not shown.H,L L,L
3 A Multi-Level Putty-Clay Production Model with Substitution Asymmetries
3.1 Introduction
As we have discussed above, the job composition of employment can only be altered by
investing in new machinery and equipment. We therefore should include the investment
decision in our analysis, in order to model the determinants of the skill composition of
employment properly. For that purpose we use a putty-clay vintage model based on Bischoff
(1971), which by its very nature introduces an asymmetry in time of substitution possibilities
between capital and labour. It should be noted that this production model which we will use
to run a number of simulation experiments is highly stylized: we have left out every detail
which is not directly connected to the representation of production technology as such, since
we are at this stage only interested in the principal working of asymmetries in substitution
possibilities between different types of labour given the asymmetries in substitution
possibilities in time (i.e. differences in substitution possibilities ex ante and ex post) between
capital on the one hand and labour on the other. More in particular, we will use a linear
1 
BN .(e µT.T,T )	'BK .	'T,T
T,t
T,T
T,t
T,T
IT,t
 (1	)t	T .IT,T
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(15)
homogeneous production function, where labour and capital are the only factors of
production. With regard to technological change, we only consider purely labour augmenting
technical change, possibly biased against low-skilled labour. 
3.2 Behavioural Assumptions
Apart from the production function features mentioned above, we will assume that producers
try to minimise production costs while producing an amount of output which is exogenously
given. Since we use a linear homogeneous production function, this implies that producers try
to minimise average production costs. As we have explained in section 2, in making their
investment decision, producers take into account expectations regarding price developments
and the consequences for future (discounted) production costs of the choice of a production
technique. However, we assume that producers do not consider the consequences which their
current investment plans may have for the formulation and realisation of plans for the not too
distant future, which in turn influence the realisation of plans still further in the future, and so
on. The solution to such an optimisation problem would have to be obtained by means of a
dynamic optimisation procedure which takes into account all future effects of the decisions
entrepreneurs have to make today. This goes beyond the illustration purposes which the
vintage model is intended to serve. 
We also assume that the supply of physical capital is infinitely elastic at the ruling price of
capital goods. Furthermore, entrepreneurs share the same expectations regarding the
development of prices. 
Note that in section 2 we have assumed that labour is a composite factor (or a 'complex' of
different types of labour) rather than a purely homogeneous factor. The 'price' of a unit of
such a complex then depends on its composition, but, for the purpose of defining the
production framework it can be assumed given for the moment.
3.3 The Putty-Clay Vintage Production Model
In the context of finding the cost minimising factor proportions on the newest vintage, it
should be noted that factor proportions ex post are assumed fixed. Hence we assume, very
much as in the job composition problem described in section 2, that entrepreneurs try to
minimise the expected present value of the total costs associated with buying and using a new
vintage over an infinite horizon. We furthermore assume that the ex ante production function
is a linearly homogeneous CES function and that only embodied labour augmenting technical
change occurs. The production structure of the vintage model can then be described by:
T 
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      The Bischoff approach disregards economic obsolescence.16
      The expected present value of the total cost per (initial) unit of output on the newest vintage over an infinite17
horizon ( ) is equal to :T
where q  represents the price of investment at time t, w   the wage rate and Í the growth rate of wages. See van Zont t
(1990) for a derivation of this result.  and  can now be obtained by minimising  conditional
on the ex ante production function as given in equation (15).
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where ) = 1/(1 + ’) is the elasticity of substitution,   and   are distribution parameters andN K
µ represents the rate of embodied labour augmenting technical change.   and   representT,t T,t
the labour/output ratio and the capital/output ratio at time t of the vintage which was installed
at time T, respectively.  Minimisation of the expected present value of the total cost per16
(initial) unit of output on the newest vintage over an infinite horizon then yields the optimim
factor proportions on the newest vintage as a function of factor prices.  In the absence of17
disembodied technical change, total capacity output X , as well as total capacity labourt
demand N  can now be obtained from :t
The vintage model now works as follows. Output is exogenously determined, and so are
wages. Together with prices the latter determine optimum factor proportions on the newest
vintage and therefore unit total cost on the newest vintage. Given the volume of capacity
output associated with 'old' equipment which has not been completely worn down yet, this
determines how 'large' the newest vintage should be. Total capacity labour demand then
follows as the capacity labour demand associated with the existing capital stock and capacity
labour demand associated with the new vintage.
3.4 Adding Heterogeneous Labour to the Production Function Framework
In section 2 we have postulated that employment is the result of a match between the demand
for labour as reflected by the number of jobs on the one hand and the supply of labour in
terms of skills on the other. We now assume that capacity labour demand within the context
of the vintage model, refers to labour demand in terms of high-level and low-level jobs, which
are combined into one job-complex. That is,   in the production function (15) represents theT,t
labour/output ratio in terms of job-efficiency units per unit of output: it comprises both low-
level and high-level jobs. 
wˆi

ˆti	i .ui ˆi
wˆi
ˆt ˆ
      This function is consistent with the isoquant j'j in Figure 5. The value of the elasticity of substitution is18
consistent with that found in Hamermesh en Grant (1979) and Hebbink (1990). Note that we do not assume here
that high-level jobs are complementary with capital. Rather, the job-complex is a substitute for capital, while low-
level and high-level jobs are substitutes within the job-complex. The reason to do so is that substitution reactions
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in response to changes in wage-rates etcetera, should become more
pronounced than when high-level jobs would be complementary with capital.
      The latter elasticity of substitution is the one found for the Netherlands by Kuipers and van Zon (1982) and19
Muysken and van Zon (1987), for instance.
      The present value price of investment is equal to the price-index of investment (see van Zon (1990) for a20
description of the assumptions underlying this result), while the present value price of labour is the initial value of
the wage rate divided by the sum of the rate of discount and the rate of technical decay less the growth rate of wages
(see section 2).
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In order to model substitution possibilities between low-level and high-level jobs within the
job-complex, we have taken a linear homogeneous job-CES-function, with an elasticity of
substitution equal to 0.5.  With regard to substitution between capital on the one hand, and18
jobs on the other, we nested the job-CES-function in another linear homogeneous CES
function with elasticity of substitution equal to 0.25.19
In the absence of skill supply constraints, the optimum composition of the labour complex in
terms of jobs and the allocation of skills to these jobs, defines the expected present value of
the total cost associated with using a job efficiency unit over an infinite horizon. Hence, this
‘present value’ price of a job efficiency unit serves the same function as the ‘present value
wage rates’ used in equations (6) and (7).20
3.5 Adding Wage and Price Responses
In standard macro-economic models, wage formation is influenced by labour productivity,
inflationary expectations and labour market conditions. Usually an increase in the rate of
unemployment decreases the rate of growth of wages, which would in turn increase the
demand for labour, ceteris paribus, which would lower unemployment again.
For illustrative purposes we have specified a very simple wage adjustment equation consisting
of a constant trend (equal to 2.5 percent in most experiments) and a Phillips effect which is
linear in the unemployment rate. Moreover, we have added a uniformly distributed random
component to the growth of wages in the range from -2 to 2 per cent. Let  refer to the value
of the growth rate of the wage rate associated with skill i, then:
where  refers to the constant trend term, and  refers to the random component in the rate of
growth of wages. Assuming that the trend growth of the wage rates of both skills are the
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      Equation (18) follows from (17) and the assumption that w /w  is constant in the steady state.21 H L
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same, it follows from this specification that the ratio of the steady state unemployment rates
by skill is defined in terms of the relative strength of the Phillips effect. More in particular, a
stable ratio of w /w  for a given supply of labour implies that, on average:H L
where  denotes the steady state rate of unemployment of skill i.  Note that this equation21
implies that for symmetric trend growth of wages and symmetric speeds of adjustment of
wage growth to unemployment, the steady state unemployment rates for low-skilled and high-
skilled workers are identical. However, if the symmetry would be broken by, for instance, a
decreasing low-skilled trend growth of wages for given supply of low- and high-skilled
workers, this would lead directly to a disparity in the long term rates of unemployment of
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. 
With regard to the price of output, we assume that it is equal to unit total cost on the newest
vintage. The price of investment is assumed to be equal to the price of output in turn.
4 Simulation Results
4.1 Introduction
In this section we will present the results of some simulation experiments in order to
illuminate the working of our model and to emphasise some interactions which might be
relevant from a policy point of view. The experiments are:
(1) an decrease in the trend growth rate of low-skilled wages;
(2) a lower demand for high-level jobs relative to low-level jobs;
(3) a higher demand for high-level jobs.
These experiments will be discussed after we have introduced the simulation set-up and
presented the base run.
4.2 The Simulation Set-Up
In order to illustrate the working of our model with asymmetric skill substitution, we
have defined a very simple general framework with output remaining fixed. This also goes for
the supply of the various types of labour. We assume that at zero rates of unemployment,
      Note that in these experiments, changes in the demand for skills due to changes in the vintage composition22
of the capital stock are necessarily underestimated due to the fact first that output does not grow, and second that
in the Bischoff vintage model economic lifetime is infinite, despite changes in unit-wage costs.
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nominal wage rates would grow with an average rate of 2.5 per cent per year with uniformly
distributed random fluctuations of 1 per cent on average. The sensitivity of the growth of
wages with respect to the rate of unemployment by skill has been set to 0.4, which is roughly
in line with the findings by van Zon et al. (1995) for the Netherlands. The interest rate is
assumed to be equal to the nominal rate of discount ’, which in turn is equal to 10 per cent.
Technical decay has been set equal to 5 per cent. The price of output (which is equal to the
price of capital goods by assumption) is set equal to marginal production cost. The parameter
e'  has been set equal to 1.25, which is in line with the wage ratio for high-skilled and low-
skilled workers given in Nickel and Bell (1995). Hence, at this particular wage ratio
entrepreneurs are assumed to be indifferent between hiring either low-skilled workers or high-
skilled workers on low-level jobs, ceteris paribus.
Starting values for the endogenous and exogenous variables were chosen such that the
distribution of jobs is 35 per cent in low-level jobs and 65 per cent in high-level jobs (in the
sense of not low). This is an exaggeration of the actual distribution, compare for instance the
figures in the introduction of this paper, but these values are used for illustrative purposes
only. 
In order to exclude the influence of the choice of intitial values for the capital stock on
the outcomes of the model, we let it run for 225 periods and then apply a shock in accordance
with the experiment under consideration. The simulation experiment always ends in period
300, although the shock is ended after 50 periods, i.e. in period 275.
4.3 The Base-Run
In Figures 4.1-4.4 below, we present the outcomes of the base-run. The average rate of
unemployment for both types of skill is about 11 percent as can be seen from Figure 4.1,
where U denotes the overall percentage rate of unemployment u, and U_L and U_H refer to
the percentage rates of unemployment of low-skilled (u ) and high-skilled workers (u ),L H
respectively. We see that u is much more stable than u  and u  . Moreover, the fluctuations inL H
u   and u  are almost perfectly negatively correlated. The reason is that changes inH L
employment are caused primarily by entrepreneurs changing their allocation of skills to jobs,
rather than changing the job-composition on the newest vintages.22
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Figure 4.3
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.1
      This implies, ceteris paribus, that the working of the chimney-effect is by necessity somewhat limited in23
numerical terms in this example.
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Figure 4.4
The ratio of high-skilled wages and low-skilled wages, w  , is on average equal to 1.40
as is shown in Figure 4.2 - fluctuations in this ratio are caused by random shocks on the one
hand and fluctuations in u  / u  on the other. Note that there is a positive correlation betweenH L
fluctuations in w  and fluctuations in u  / u , with changes in unemployment rates leading0 H L
changes in the wage ratio by 1 period by assumption. However, changes in wages, by altering
expectations with respect to wage growth also have an effect on employment (and
unemployment) which is much smoother that the original changes in relative wages. Seen
from this perspective, changes in unemployment rates follow changes in wage rates by a
couple of years (expectations are based on realisations over the last three periods by
assumption). Figure 4.3 shows the rates of job-utilisation for high- and low-level jobs,
QH_STAR and QL_STAR, respectively. These are both equal to one, indicating that there are
no quantitative supply constraints in this case. QLL_STAR indicates the share of low-level
jobs manned by low-skilled workers. The fact that it is not equal to one, whereas all low-level
jobs are fully manned, indicates that in the baserun only a slight fraction of low-level jobs is
manned by high-skilled workers.  QHL_STAR is not reported here, however.23
4.4 A Cut in Low-Skilled Wages
Experiment 1 is concerned with a fall in the trend growth of low-skilled wages by 1
percentage point. In the steady state, this would lead to a fall in the equilibrium rate of
unemployment with about 2.5 percentage points (see equation (18)). From Figure 4.4 it can be
seen that this leads to a structural fall in the relative wage rate of low-skilled workers during
the experimental period and hence to a rise in w . From Figure 4.5 one sees that this has the0
effect of raising the rate of high-skilled unemployment by slightly less than the rate of low-
skilled unemployment falls. Note that there are large, negatively correlated swings in both
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Figure 4.5
Figure 4.6
unemployment rates due to employers switching between skills on low-level jobs, especially
before and after the experimental period, when producers do not have a clearcut preference for
either low-skilled workers or high-skilled workers on low-level jobs. Note, moreover, that
overall unemployment hardly changes. Nonetheless, the relative rise in low-level jobs is about
twice as high as the fall in high-level jobs, as is shown in Figure 4.6. From this figure one also
sees that the relative changes in the employment of high- and low-skilled workers are much
more outspoken than the relative changes in corresponding jobs. Note moreover, that
percentage changes in employment are larger (in absolute terms) than the corresponding
percentage changes in jobs, for both low- and high-level jobs. 
The overall conclusion to be drawn is then that a change in the growth rate of low-
skilled wages does change the job composition of employment and employment itself in
favour of low-level jobs. However, from a macro-perspective this seems to be very much a
zero sum game, i.e. growth of output, c.q. substitution of labour for capital, will be needed to
generate net positive results.
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Figure 4.7
4.5 Experiments Concerning the Working of the Chimney Effect
In order to simulate the working of the chimney effect, we have introduced a bias in
job augmenting technical change, thus changing the job composition of the demand for labour.
In experiment 2 we have assumed a 1 per cent high-level job saving rate of technical change
and a 1 per cent low-level job using technical change. Hence, less high-level and more low-
level jobs are needed to generate one job efficiency unit, and it is obvious that the job
composition of labour demand shifts in favour of low-level jobs. Since the demand for high-
skilled workers on account of high-level jobs is now diminished for a given supply of high-
skilled workers, relatively more high-skilled workers will be available for low-level jobs. In
this case, the creation of low-level jobs does not necessarily have to lead to an increase in low-
skilled employment. Rather, the 'excess availability' of high-skilled workers may reduce the
employment opportunities for low-skilled workers. 
By contrast, experiment 3 assumes only a 1 per cent high-level job using technical
change, thus creating the conditions for the chimney effect to occur. Now a given supply of
high-skilled labour will be confronted with an ever growing number of high-level jobs, thus
reducing the amount of high-skilled labour available for employment on low-level jobs. 
The effects on relative wages of both experiments have been depicted in Figure 4.4.
The impact on relative wages is quite different in both cases. In experiment 2 w  falls initially,0
because of the shift in demand towards low-level jobs, but after a while the Phillips-effect
leads to a stabilisation of the relative wage rate, although w  oscillates around this stable value.0
By contrast, experiment 3 generates a demand for high-skilled labour which cannot be realised
due to supply constraints, and consequently high-skilled wages keep on rising.
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Figure 4.10
Figure 4.9
Figure 4.8
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Figure 4.13
Figure 4.12
Figure 4.11
-30-
Figures 4.7-4.13 show the principal differences between both experiments. In
experiment 2, relative wages fluctuate more or less around their base-run values. The reason is
that the 1 per cent rate of high-job saving technical change increases the availability of high-
skilled workers for low-level jobs. Moreover, the initial increase in u  decreases w , but wH 0 0
does not decrease enough to fully counter the increase in u . Also u  starts to rise, whichH L
depresses low-skilled wages and hence increases w  again. The main effect is that changes in0
u  and u  fluctuate around an upward trend in the overall rate of unemployment, as can be seenL H
from Figure 4.7. The reason is that the additional availability of high-skilled workers makes
them replace low-skilled workers on low-level jobs. However, the increase in the number of
low-level jobs does still not lead to a one for one rise in employment of low-skilled workers,
as can be seen from Figure 4.8, where the percentage rise in low-skilled employment lags
behind the percentage rise in low-level jobs. At the same time, the percentage fall in high-
skilled employment is far less outspoken than the decrease in high-level jobs, which indicates
that at least part of the growth of low-level jobs is absorbed by high-skilled workers rather
than low-skilled workers. Moreover, the share of high-skilled workers on low-skilled jobs
increases (see Figure 4.9 where QHL_STAR rises over the experimental period, while
QLL_STAR falls and QL_STAR and QH_STAR are equal to 1), thus mitigating the
effectiveness of the creation of low-level jobs for furthering employment opportunities for
low-skilled workers. The bias in technical change is illustrated quite clearly in Figure 4.8
where low-level jobs increase and high-level jobs decrease. Nonetheless, both high-skilled
employment and low-skilled employment decrease (with fluctuations around this decreasing
trend). Note that due to the existence of unemployment for both types of workers, supply
constraints can not be binding, and so, experiment 2 shows that the effectiveness of the
creation of low-level jobs in alleviating low-level unemployment is negatively affected by the
existence of excess supply of high-skilled workers. 
By contrast, experiment 3 shows that the introduction of high-level job using technical change,
leading to the creation of additional high-level jobs, may be much more effective in creating
employment opportunities for low-skilled workers than the creation of low-level jobs did in
the context of experiment 2. In Figure 4.11 we see that the introduction of high-level job using
technical change does not only increase the number of high-level jobs, but also the number of
low-level jobs. The latter is caused by the phenomenon of substitution of low-level jobs for
high-level jobs, which is induced by the increase in high-skilled wages following on the
reduction in high-skilled unemployment. Nonetheless, low-skilled employment is only
positively affected for part of the experimental period, i.e. from 225-255 as indicated by the
fall in QH_STAR below 1 from period 255, as shown in Figure 4.13. However, until the
supply of high-skilled workers becomes limitational, low-skilled employment is favoured too,
by high-skilled using technical change as indicated in Figure 4.10, where the rate of
unemployment for low-skilled workers falls in a slower pace than the rate of unemployment
for high-skilled workers does. In period 255, high-skilled unemployment becomes zero, and
low-skilled unemployment starts rising again. With minor changes in the allocation of high-
and low-skilled workers to low-level jobs after period 255, we see that high-level employment
stabilises at a level given by supply, as indicated in Figure 4.12. Hence the increase in demand
for high-skilled workers due to the increase in high-level jobs, enlarges employment
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opportunities for low-skilled workers too.
The main conclusions of experiment 3 are therefore first that the creation of high-level jobs
may favour employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, and secondly that the
occurrence of bottlenecks in the supply of high-skilled workers may also diminish
employment prospects for low-skilled workers. Both conclusions point to the paradox of
needing to monitor the high-skilled side of the labour market, especially in times of low-
skilled unemployment.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the outlines of a labour allocation model which focuses on
asymmetries in substitution possibilities between different types of labour. The general idea
underlying this model is that high-skilled people can take over the jobs of low-skilled people
but not necessarily the other way around. This implies that the number of low-level jobs is an
upper-limit to low-skilled employment, while the number of high-level jobs is a lower limit to
high-skilled employment. We assume that a high-skilled person has a non-zero efficiency on a
low-level job, whereas a low-skilled person has zero efficiency on a high-level job, which is
an exaggeration of the actual immobility of skills between jobs.
We have assumed forward looking behaviour for the firm. Entrepreneurs determine the job
composition of employment, as well as the capital intensity of production, based on the
expected growth of relative wages. Moreover, in deciding about the job-composition of labour
demand, they take account of future changes in the allocation of skills to jobs - when relative
wages and relative efficiencies indicate that this would be the most profitable thing to do. We
have linked the cost of changing/making an allocation between skills and jobs to the cost of
learning. This automatically divides available supply of a certain skill into two groups: the
internal pool of people with experience relevant to a certain match, and both internal and
external pools of people with no experience in the match under consideration. We solve the
allocation problem by means of the definition of a linear programming module, which takes
explicitly account of both the existence of asymmetric substitution possibilities between skills
on certain jobs, and the available supply of people with and without experience in a certain
match between skills and jobs.
A typical solution to the problem of the uneven distribution of unemployment across skills is
to rely much on wage flexibility to alleviate this problem. However, one of the results of our
model is that asymmetries in substitution possibilities between low-skilled and high-skilled
people imply that in order to achieve a positive net employment response by means of a
change in the job composition in favour of low-level jobs, quite a fall in low-skilled wages
may be required. But even then the largest impact on low-skilled unemployment is to be
expected from diminishing the incentives for having high-skilled people replace low-skilled
people on low-level jobs.
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We also ran two simulation experiments to illustrate the working of the so-called chimney
effect. It was shown that the creation of low-level jobs in a situation of excess supply of high-
skilled workers may not be an effective way of creating employment opportunities for low-
skilled workers. Instead, the creation of high-level jobs which requires reallocations of high-
skilled workers from low-level jobs to high-level jobs may be much more effective in
generating effective job-openings for low-skilled workers than the direct creation of low-level
jobs would be (this is the chimney effect). Moreover, the creation of high-level jobs may lead
to the creation of low-level jobs as a 'by-effect', which would essentially increase the
effectiveness of the creation of high-level jobs in alleviating low-skilled unemployment
problems. These last conclusions point to the paradox of needing to monitor the high-skilled
side of the labour market, especially in times of low-skilled unemployment.
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(A.1)
(A.2)
(A.3)
Annex A. Solving the Intertemporal Cost Minimisation Problem
For cases 2 and 3, there are two periods to consider, i.e. the pre-switching period and
the post-switching period. Case 4 is the case where both L and H skills are used to fill L* and
H* jobs. The various objective functions associated with the cases mentioned above are given
in equations (A.1)-(A.3).
The cost function parameters  and  presented in table A.1, can be derived from for
a given moment of switching t*. These are presented in the table below, where z is defined to
be equal to .
In order for the cost-minimisation problem to have a meaningful solution, it follows
that the 's and 's should be positive. This requires the growth rates of high-skilled wages
and low-skilled wages to be less than  , which we have had to assume in the first place in
order to obtain finite objective function values. Hence, all the 's are positive, while it is
immediately clear that  and  are positive too. In order for  to be positive, it is necessary
that (e'/w ) <z+1. Note that in case 3 z>0 and e'/w <1, which implies that (e'/w ) <1<z+1 for0 0 0z z
z>0, as required. For case 2 similar results can be obtained. Defining z'=-z, the requirement
that  implies that (w /e') -z'<0, since z+1<0, by assumption. Because w /e'<1 in case 2,0 0z'-1
this only holds for z'>1, i.e. for z<-1.  Hence  when z<-1. Using the definition for z (see24
above), this requires that , which is true by assumption. 
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Table A.1 Cost Function Parameters
Case
1
2
3
4
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